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ARGUMENT
I.

THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO APPLY THE LAW OF THE CASE
Upon review of Provo City's brief, it is clear that Provo City assumes that it owned

old 900 South. At the same time, however, Provo City recognizes that in 1869, Mayor
Abraham O. Smoot issued deeds to the abutting land owners both north and south of the
roadway. Provo City concedes:
The deeds from Mayor Smoot ran to the edge of the roadway but did not
specifically exclude it.
Provo City's Brief at 4. Provo City's arguments fail to recognize that prior to the Federal
Townsite Act, the property was owned by the United States of America, not by Provo
City. Through the Federal Townsite Act the Mayor of Provo, Mayor Smoot, was able to
deed the property away. The trial court in the present matter failed to apply the law of the
case in that the trial court specifically held that Provo received title without a deed,
although this court specifically held previously that in order for the city to hold title to the
property, a deed would have been required.
Provo City's arguments fail to recognize the operative actions of the fiduciary in
this case occurred in 1869. When Mayor Smoot deeded the property both north and south
of the roadway he deeded up to the center of the roadway. There simply existed from that
day forward no underlying property interest in Provo City. Provo City has breached its
fiduciary duties by attempting to convey what it did not own, the underlying roadway, and
in opposing this action to quiet title.
1

This court held that Provo City did not own the property in fee (Nelson v. Provo
City, 872 P.2d 35, 37-38 (Utah App. 1994); the trial court held that the City did own the
underlying property in fee (R. 238-39). Upon this basis alone the trial court should be
reversed. All of the trial court's conclusions flow from this misapprehension of
controlling law.
II.

TITLE WAS PASSED TO THE CENTER OF THE ROADWAY
As argued above, the city did not have title to the roadway. Essentially, when

Mayor Smoot deeded the properties north and south of the roadway, all that was left for
the inhabitants of the city was an easement. Provo City never acquired title, as they never
received a deed, and thereby had no fee interest in the property. Throughout its brief,
Provo City cannot even articulate the interest it actually held. This is easily explainable,
since Provo City did not hold title.
Provo City refers to the Utah Supreme Court decision of Knight v. Thomas, 101 P.
383 (Utah 1909) to buttress its position that it somehow owned an interest in the roadway
based upon the arguments that a city "may" own a street in fee. However, even the
Knight decision recognizes that when a street is vacated, "the right to occupy and use the
land belongs to him in whom the fee is - the city, or the original land owner if it was
reserved by him and not conveyed, or to the abutting property owner - the land then
is subject to all use and enjoyment and burdens of other lands[.]" Knight, 101 P. at
384(emphasis added). Thus, the Knight decision actually buttresses the position of the

2

Appellants in this matter. The City of Provo has never had a fee interest in the property.
The original landowner, the United States, nor their trustee, Mayor Smoot, did not reserve
title to the roadway. Therefore, the underlying fee is in the abutting land owners. It is
precisely for the reasons stated in the Knight decision - that the original land owner did
not reserve the roadway to himself- that the land was in fact conveyed to the abutting
landowners. Nowhere in the record, and no case law supports the conclusion, that the fee
interest is found in Provo City. Instead, the Knight decision compels the conclusion that
when Mayor Smoot conveyed the property to the abutting landowners, those abutting
landowners were by operation of law granted a conveyance to the middle of the street.
Accordingly, when Provo City de facto vacated or abandoned the roadway, the underlying
fee reverted back to the plaintiffs.
Provo City's argument simply fails to recognize the law applicable to the deeding
of property. Provo City has in no way distinguished or showed the inapplicability of
Falula Farms. Inc. v. Ludlow. 866 P.2d 569 (Utah App. 1993) or Fenn v. Cedar Lumbar
& Hardware Co.. 404 P.2d 966 (Utah 1965). The Fenn decision clearly states that where
a lack of intention exists to show that the grantor meant to deed property to the center of a
street, such intention would be assumed. Under the undisputed facts and the law of this
case, there is no question but that Mayor Smoot deeded to the center of the street. As
such, Provo City only retained a public highway easement to the roadway by its continued
use. Where that use was discontinued and Provo City attempted to deed the property to a
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third party, that easement no longer exists. Provo City simply cannot avoid the legal
conclusion that (1) the property was originally deeded by Mayor Smoot to the middle of
the street, (2) that Mayor Smoot did not reserve the roadway in any way, and therefore (3)
upon the defacto vacation or abandonment of the roadway, the underlying fee reverted to
the abutting land owners. Thus, the legal relationships between the parties were fixed
over 100 years ago when Mayor Smoot made the initial conveyance.
There has never been any dispute that the city never explicitly reserved the
roadway or obtained a deed to the roadway. This court in Nelson v. Provo City, 872 P.2d
35, 38 (Utah App. 1994) specifically held that the city did not own the property in
absolute ownership. However, the trial court in its subsequent rulings to Nelson, in direct
contravention of this court's opinion, ruled that the city held title to the property. The
trial court's ruling wholly ignores the law of the case as announced by this court and
ignores the legal conclusions which follow as necessity by virtue of the fact that Mayor
Smoot deeded the property to the abutting landowners.
Provo City never owned the land upon which old 900 South was found. At the
time of the grant, when Utah was still a territory of the United States, the land upon which
900 South was situated was owned by the United States. Thus, the public had but an
easement to travel thereupon. The occupants of Provo have never had more than an
easement to travel upon 900 South. The grant in 1871 did not change this fundamental
interest. Mayor Smoot only transferred property to the abutting landowners; the city
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received no deed, nor did the city reserve the roadway. Thus, the underlying reversionary
interest was granted to the abutting landowners long before 1989. The city's interest,
whether or not held in trust, expired when old 900 South was no longer used as a
roadway.
The legal conclusion flowing from the trial court's misapprehension of law cannot
be more plain. The trial court itself recognized that if all the occupants of the city had
was an easement, the plaintiffs theory upon which they maintained a right to quiet title
would prevail. The trial court stated:

The court believes that Plaintiffs argument would have merit if the city and
the collective occupants of the city of Provo only had a right of way or an
easement to use the road.
(R. 238). With the correct law applied, including this courf s determinations in Nelson,
Plaintiffs position must prevail. By operation of law, when Mayor Smoot deeded the
property to the abutting landowners, he deeded to the center of the road. All that was left
to the collective occupants of the city was an easement.
Provo City attempts to simply brush aside this court's opinion in Falula Farms, Inc.
v. Lundlow, 866 P.2d 569 (Utah App. 1993). Provo City basically argues that because the
trial court below did not find the Falula Farms decision persuasive, this court should
simply ignore it. However, the similarities between Falula Farms and the present action
are myriad. Like the present action, Falula Farms dealt with a quiet title action where a
party who owned property abutting a roadway wanted to move the roadway further onto
5

its property. An exchange occurred where the party deeded the land to the county for the
new road and the county in turn deeded the old roadway to the developer party. In the
present matter, Provo City moved the roadway to the south and attempted to deed what
had been the roadway to a third party.
In Falula Farms, this court held that the county's attempted conveyance was void
and quieted title in one half of the roadway to the abutting landowner. Falula Farms
recognized that at common law the owner of land which abutted the highway owned up to
the middle of the highway. Falula Farms recognized under common law principles that
the public has no more than an easement in land dedicated as a public highway or road.
Land is dedicated as a public highway or road by use. .See Utah Code Ann. § 27-12-89
(1953, as amended); Clark v. Erekson, 9 Utah 2d 212, 341 P.2d 424, 425-26 (1959);
Whittaker v. Ferguson, 51 P. 980 (Utah 1898). Most importantly, the Falula Farms
decision recognized that when a city or county abandons or vacates a dedicated highway
or road, the abutting landowners who own and possess the underlying property to the
middle of the highway or road are entitled to that land.
In this case, Provo City defacto vacated, or more clearly abandoned old 900 South.
Accordingly, the plaintiffs, as abutting land owners, own and should possess the
underlying property. Therefore, this court must remand this matter to the trial court with
instructions to quiet title in the plaintiffs.
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III.

TITLE MUST BE QUIETED IN THE PLAINTIFFS
Where in Nelson this court did not expressly determine the interests which the city

held to the roadway, this court must now expressly hold that the city held no more than a
determinable fee, which no longer exists. The court in Sears v. Ogden City, 572 P.2d
1359 (Utah 1977) held that where a party acquired the fee to the land abutting a street,
there was a presumption that the conveyance included a fee to the highway centerline
"subject to the public way (determinable fee)." Sears, 572 P.2d at 1369 n.9. That same
presumption and conclusion of common law exists in the present case. When the
plaintiffs predecessors in interest acquired the fee to the land abutting the street, there
was a presumption that the conveyance included the fee to the highway centerline subject
to the public right of way, or determinable fee. When the city abandoned its use of this
roadway, the reversionary interest reverted back to the plaintiffs. Accordingly, title must
be quieted in the plaintiffs now.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, this court must reverse and remand the trial court's
holding and title must be quieted in the plaintiffs.
DATED AND SIGNED this 16th day of March, 2000.

DAVID N. MORTENSEN
IVIE & YOUNG
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
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